Extension card · Fuzzy
Fuzzy FMEA DEA (Adesina, Yazdi, Zarei and Pouyakian, 2022)
This is a hybrid method in which experts score a failure mode's severity, occurrence and detectability verbally, derive the classical risk priority number (RPN) from these scores, and compare the cost-time efficiency of corrective actions with DEA. The output is both a risk magnitude and a DEA efficiency score.
Base method
DEA →
Philosophy, mechanics, strengths and weaknesses are on the base method card; this card describes only the difference.
Data type (family)
Fuzzy →
What this data type is, when to use it, how to write it in a cell: the family's full account is here.
What Changes from the Base Method?
Cells. In classical DEA the input and output columns are direct crisp numbers. Here the three input-side measures, severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D), are collected from experts as triangular fuzzy numbers; each expert scores these three measures on a verbal scale declared in advance, from "very low" to "very high", and the scale converts every term into a triangle. The corrective action's cost and duration, by contrast, are entered directly as crisp numbers; they are not fuzzified.
Scale equalisation and defuzzification. When more than one expert is involved, the scores are first pooled by a weighted sum, using each expert's own reliability weight; DecisionMind takes these weights as an external input. This pooled triangle is then reduced to a single crisp number by the centre-of-area (CoA) method and carried onto FMEA's standard 1-10 scale. This defuzzification happens before the DEA step, in the middle of the calculation, not right at the start as in Fuzzy DEMATEL, but immediately before the RPN is calculated.
Distance, score and combination. The classical FMEA product gives the risk priority number (RPN = S×O×D) from the defuzzified S, O and D values. Each failure mode then counts as a DEA unit (DMU): the inputs are S, O, D and the inverse of RPN; the outputs are the inverses of the corrective action's cost and duration. Classical input-oriented DEA (CCR) here answers the question of how efficiently this failure mode's corrective action uses its resources, cost and duration, relative to the other failure modes.
Result and defuzzification. The output is not a single number but two separate pieces of information: the RPN, the risk magnitude from the defuzzified S, O, D, and the DEA efficiency score theta (the corrective action's resource efficiency). DecisionMind reports the two side by side; a failure mode with theta=1 is efficient in terms of its corrective action, but this does not mean it is risk-free.
How to Read the Output
RPN is read as on the classical FMEA card: a high RPN means high risk, but it is not, on its own, a ranking tool. DEA's theta value is read as on the DEA card: a value of 1 shows that this failure mode's corrective action sits at the frontier of resource use.
The difference is this: these two numbers answer different questions and do not substitute for one another. A failure mode with a high RPN can still come out DEA-efficient (theta=1); this means "high risk, but the corrective action is cheap and fast." A failure mode with a low RPN may also be DEA-inefficient; this means "low risk, but the corrective action is expensive and slow."
For this reason, instead of writing:
"This failure mode came out DEA-efficient, so it is not a priority"
the report should read:
"This failure mode's corrective action is efficient in resource use (θ=1), but if its RPN is high the risk priority is still high; the two pieces of information should be read together"
When to Prefer This over the Base Method
Use this extension when the severity, occurrence and detectability scores for failure modes are collected from experts verbally or approximately, and the cost-time efficiency of corrective actions also needs to be compared at the same time. If S, O and D are already given as crisp numbers, for example ratios calculated from historical failure records, fuzzifying them is unnecessary; classical FMEA's RPN can be fed directly into crisp DEA. DEA's exit condition applies here too: the number of failure modes must be sufficient relative to the sum of inputs (four: S, O, D, 1/RPN) and outputs (two: 1/cost, 1/duration); DecisionMind recommends at least six failure modes.
Mistakes Specific to This Extension
Confusing DEA efficiency with risk level. As the manifest itself points out, a failure mode that is efficient in terms of its corrective action (θ=1) can still carry a high RPN; the priority decision requires both together.
Having too few failure modes relative to the sum of inputs and outputs. With four inputs and two outputs, a reliable distinction needs at least six failure modes; if this condition is not met, almost every failure mode comes out DEA-efficient and the discriminating power is lost.
Failing to declare the verbal scale, or letting it vary from expert to expert. The meaning of a term such as "high" is fixed before the analysis, written into the report, and applied identically to every expert.
Ranking efficient failure modes by theta alone, without looking at RPN at all. DecisionMind's current engine lists failure modes with equal theta values in input order; this order does not automatically reflect the size of RPN. The illustrative example below shows this distinction clearly, and the RPN column must be read separately when the final priority decision is made.
The governing principle is this:
RPN measures the risk magnitude, DEA's theta measures the corrective action's resource efficiency; the two need not be high together or low together, and the priority decision is made by looking at both at once.
Cases
The first case is DecisionMind's validation example. Adesina, Yazdi, Zarei and Pouyakian's (2022) aircraft-landing-system application publishes only the final ranking; the expert S/O/D scores and the cost-duration data do not appear in the paper. This is why the J block is an illustrative example with four failure modes, traceable by hand, that tests the method's steps (TFN pooling, CoA defuzzification, RPN, DEA CCR) end to end; it is not the paper's own table. The second case is an illustrative fiction.
1. Illustrative example: The risk and corrective-action efficiency of four failure modes (DecisionMind's validation example)
A team has assessed four failure modes (FM1-FM4) for severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D). In this example the two experts' scores agree exactly, so the fuzzy triangles are entered already crisp (l=m=u); in real applications these triangles usually carry genuine uncertainty, with differing endpoints.
| Failure mode | S | O | D | RPN (S×O×D) | Cost | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FM1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 2 |
| FM2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 125 | 200 | 15 |
| FM3 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 512 | 1000 | 50 |
| FM4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 125 | 500 | 30 |
| Input/Output | Input | Input | Input | Input (1/RPN) | Output (1/Cost) | Output (1/Duration) |
(There is no "Weight" row in the DEA family.)
The method first defuzzifies S, O and D (in this example the triangles are already crisp, so defuzzification does not change the numbers), finds RPN by multiplication, then runs each failure mode through DEA CCR as a DEA unit.
| Failure mode | DEA efficiency (θ) |
|---|---|
| FM1 | 1.000 |
| FM2 | 1.000 |
| FM3 | 1.000 |
| FM4 | 0.500 |
The result reads as follows: FM2 and FM4 have identical severity, occurrence and detectability scores (RPN=125), but FM4's corrective action costs and takes exactly twice as much as FM2's. DEA captures this difference: FM2 is efficient in terms of its corrective action (θ=1), while FM4 is not (θ=0.5). FM1 (RPN=12, the lowest risk) and FM3 (RPN=512, the highest risk) are also efficient in terms of their corrective action.
The team's hesitation is this: by theta, FM1, FM2 and FM3 appear equally efficient, but their risk magnitudes (12, 125, 512) are very different. DecisionMind's current engine lists these three failure modes in input order (FM1, FM2, FM3); this order does not reflect the size of RPN. The team should base its priority decision not only on the theta order but also on the RPN column: FM3, the highest-risk failure mode whose corrective action is also efficient, is the one that should be examined first despite the tie in theta.
In the report: "FM1, FM2 and FM3 are efficient in terms of their corrective action (θ=1.000); FM4 is not (θ=0.500), because although it shares the same risk profile as FM2, its corrective action costs twice as much and takes twice as long. Among the three efficient failure modes, priority should be set by RPN magnitude rather than engine order: FM3 (RPN=512) should be examined first."
Source: This is a synthetic, hand-built validation example for DecisionMind's FUZZY-FMEA-DEA (Adesina, Yazdi, Zarei and Pouyakian, 2022) engine, traceable by hand; it is not the numbers from the paper's own case study (the aircraft landing system), because the paper publishes only the final ranking. The RPN and theta values were independently recomputed in Python by this card's author and matched the internal audit record in the DecisionMind manifest exactly.
2. Textiles: Assessing stitching-quality failure modes on a production line
A textile factory will assess the failure modes on its stitching line, fabric tearing, skipped stitches, dimension deviation, and dye staining, for both risk and corrective-action efficiency. The quality team has scored the severity, occurrence and detectability of each failure mode on a verbal scale, and has also recorded each corrective action's estimated cost and implementation time.
The method first defuzzifies the scores and calculates RPN, then uses DEA to compare the resource efficiency of the corrective actions. Suppose fabric tearing has the highest RPN but is also DEA-efficient because its corrective action, slowing the line speed, is cheap and fast; suppose dimension deviation has a lower RPN but is not DEA-efficient because its corrective action, new measuring equipment, is expensive and slow.
The factory's hesitation is this: if resources are limited, which should be invested in first? Looking only at RPN favours fabric tearing, but this is already a problem with a cheap fix. Looking only at DEA overlooks dimension deviation, even though its risk remains moderate despite the expensive fix. The decision requires both pieces of information together.
In the report: "Fabric tearing carries the highest risk priority number (RPN) and its corrective action is resource-efficient; the priority here is clear. Dimension deviation carries a lower risk, but its corrective action is not resource-efficient; this investment decision requires a separate cost assessment."
3. What Not to Do
The first mistake is interpreting FM1, FM2 and FM3 all having θ=1 in the illustrative example as "all three carry equal priority"; their RPNs (12, 125, 512) are very different, and the priority decision cannot ignore this gap. The second mistake is reading FM4's θ=0.5 as "FM4's risk is higher than FM2's"; FM4's S, O and D scores are identical to FM2's, the difference lies only in the corrective action's cost and duration. The third mistake is feeding a single expert's score into RPN as if it were the group's view, without averaging across experts, before defuzzifying the verbal scale; when more than one expert is involved, the weighted-pooling step cannot be skipped.
Sources
For the formulas behind each step, the intermediate tables and citation formats, see the DecisionMind method page: decisionmind.app/library/fuzzy-fmea-dea
Adesina, K. A., Yazdi, M., Zarei, E., & Pouyakian, M. (2022). Smart decision fuzzy-based data envelopment model for failure modes and effects analysis. In M. Yazdi (Ed.), Linguistic Methods Under Fuzzy Information in System Safety and Reliability Analysis (Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, Vol. 414, pp. 151–168). Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-93352-4_7
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., & Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6), 429–444. DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(78)90138-8
Buckley, J. J. (1985). Fuzzy hierarchical analysis. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 17(3), 233–247. DOI: 10.1016/0165-0114(85)90090-9
Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8(3), 338–353. DOI: 10.1016/S0019-9958(65)90241-X