Methods · Aggregation and voting
COOK-SEIFORD (Distance-Based Consensus Method)
COOK-SEIFORD finds the single assignment that minimises the total gap between each alternative's positions across different ranking sources and a possible target rank.
Base method's data type: Classical
What Is the Method?
COOK-SEIFORD is an aggregation method that reduces several ranking sources to a single complete order. Where CONDORCET, COPELAND, DODGSON and KEMENY-YOUNG all rest on pairwise majority comparisons, COOK-SEIFORD uses an entirely different logic: it looks directly at the position numbers (first, second, third) the alternatives receive across the ranking sources, and assigns each alternative to the target rank closest to its positions. This assignment is a matching problem, solved with the Hungarian algorithm. The method was proposed by Wade D. Cook and Lawrence M. Seiford in 1978.
The Philosophy Behind It
The question COOK-SEIFORD asks is this: "whichever final rank I place each alternative into, which arrangement moves it least, in total, from its positions across the different sources?" The method works directly with position numbers rather than pairwise contests. Whether an alternative is first or second is read from which rank it holds, not from whom it beat. For every alternative, the total cost of assigning it to each possible target rank (its absolute distance from that rank across all sources) is calculated. The assignment that minimises this total cost across all alternatives is then found.
This differs fundamentally from the CONDORCET family's "who beats whom" logic; COOK-SEIFORD never invokes the concept of a majority at all. The consequence is that the method is unaffected by a Condorcet cycle, because it never carries out pairwise comparison in the first place. But there is a cost: the assignment problem can have several equal-cost solutions; in that case the method produces not one single "correct" rank but several equally valid candidate ranks (Armstrong, Cook and Seiford, 1982).
How It Works
The method proceeds through two steps.
First, building the distance matrix. For every alternative and every possible target rank, the absolute difference between that alternative's positions across all sources and that target rank is summed. This produces a cost figure between every alternative and every possible rank.
Second, finding the lowest-total-cost assignment. With each alternative assigned to exactly one target rank, and each target rank to exactly one alternative, the matching that minimises the total cost is found with the Hungarian algorithm. This assignment gives the alternatives' final rank.
The formulas behind each step and the intermediate tables are given on the DecisionMind method page; this card carries no formulas.
How to Read the Output
The output is a target rank number assigned to each alternative; the total cost shows how far this assignment sits from the alternatives' actual positions. If the total cost is small, the assigned rank sits fairly close to the positions given by all the sources; if it is large, the sources disagree substantially on position. This figure is not a percentage or a probability, it is only a unit of total absolute difference.
The most critical point is that the lowest-total-cost assignment is not always unique. Several assignments can give the same lowest total. In that case, which alternative is placed at which rank is chosen among several mathematically equally valid options. This choice must be made by an external rule (alphabetical order, or an additional criterion, for instance) (Armstrong, Cook and Seiford, 1982).
For that reason, instead of writing:
"COOK-SEIFORD found this rank definitively"
it is correct to write:
"This assignment is the arrangement that moves least, in total, from the alternatives' positions; if several equal-cost arrangements exist, the report must state which one was chosen"
Data Type and Inputs
COOK-SEIFORD works with crisp data: the position given by each source is a whole number. DecisionMind has no fuzzy, grey or similar data-type extension of this method; it works only with crisp rank data.
You need the following: a table in which every source ranks all the alternatives completely. A minimum of two alternatives and two ranking sources is required. COOK-SEIFORD neither asks for nor produces weights; every source's position is counted equally.
When to Use It, When Not To
COOK-SEIFORD is suitable if you have several ranking sources and your aim is to reconcile the position numbers they give directly, without needing pairwise majority logic. Because it is unaffected by a Condorcet cycle, it is a practical alternative for small alternative sets where the risk of a cycle is high.
The case where it should not be used is one that requires a single definitive result, where several equal-cost assignments cannot be accepted. Also, if the "who beats whom" information itself matters (for instance, if you need to show that a winner has majority support), moving to a method based on pairwise comparison is more appropriate.
I want to reconcile position numbers directly, and stay unaffected by a cycle → COOK-SEIFORD
I want to see the winner's pairwise majority support → CONDORCET, COPELAND
I want a rank that globally minimises total disagreement → KEMENY-YOUNG
I only want to find the winner, on a least-change logic → DODGSON
Strengths
COOK-SEIFORD's greatest strength is its independence from pairwise majority logic; a Condorcet cycle never affects it at all, because it never looks at who beats whom in the first place. Because the method works directly with position numbers, it is intuitively understandable: it gives an answer close to the question "roughly where does this alternative sit across the sources on average?" The Hungarian algorithm is computationally light and stays predictable as the number of alternatives grows.
Weaknesses
COOK-SEIFORD's fundamental limitation is that the lowest-cost assignment is frequently not unique; several equal-cost solutions can arise, and the method itself makes no choice among them (Armstrong, Cook and Seiford, 1982). Second, the method looks only at position numbers; an alternative being in second place does not show whether it missed first place by a small or a large margin, because the sources give only a rank number, not a score. Third, because the position-based approach does not use pairwise majority information, it does not directly show whether an alternative is clearly preferred by a majority.
Common Mistakes
The most common mistake is assuming the lowest-cost assignment is unique; if several equal-cost assignments exist, showing only one of them and concealing the others is misleading. A second mistake is reading the total cost as though it were a percentage or an error rate; this figure is only the total absolute position difference. A third is presenting a COOK-SEIFORD result as though it were a majority winner; the method never looks at pairwise majority at all, it only reconciles position numbers. A fourth is allowing some sources to rank the alternatives incompletely; every source must rank all the alternatives.
The governing principle is this:
The rank COOK-SEIFORD gives is the assignment that moves least, in total, from the alternatives' positions across the sources; this assignment may not be unique, and the report must state this clearly.
Cases
Each case opens with a table of several ranking sources, describes in words what the method does to it, and shows how to read the result. The first case is taken from a textbook applying the method. The third case shows concretely, with real numbers, how COOK-SEIFORD behaves in the face of a Condorcet cycle.
1. Sports Facility: Four pitch proposals across four assessment sources (Orakçı, 2024, Table 1.4)
A municipality's sports facilities unit has had four pitch proposals (A, B, C, D) ranked by four separate assessment sources (R1, R2, R3, R4).
| Proposal | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| B | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| C | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| D | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 |
The method first calculates, for every proposal, the cost of assigning it to each of the four possible target ranks (first, second, third, fourth); this cost is the sum of the absolute differences between the proposal's positions across the four sources and that target rank. It then finds the assignment that minimises these costs.
| Proposal | Assigned rank |
|---|---|
| C | 1 |
| A | 2 |
| B | 3 |
| D | 4 |
This assignment's total cost is fourteen. As the textbook itself notes, more than one assignment gives a total cost of fourteen in this problem; an assignment placing A first and C second, instead of C first and A second, gives the same total cost. For that reason, the textbook attaches a note reading "several equal-cost solutions exist" rather than a single definitive rank for this example.
The assessment board hesitates here: D being in fourth place stays fixed across all the equal-cost assignments, because D's positions (four, four, four, one) are clearly different from those of the other proposals. But the ranking among A, B and C can change depending on which equal-cost assignment is chosen.
In the report: "In the lowest-cost assignment reconciling the positions given by the four assessment sources, D is fixed in fourth place; the ranking among A, B and C has been settled by one of several equal-cost solutions, and this choice must be explained by an additional rule."
Source: Orakçı, E. (2024), Çok Kriterli Karar Verme Problemleri için Toplulaştırma Teknikleri, Özgür Yayınları, §1.8.7, Table 1.4. This is the book's own figures and table data; DecisionMind's COOK-SEIFORD engine produces the same total cost (fourteen).
2. Theatre: Three plays ranked by three critics
At a theatre festival, three critics (E1, E2, E3) will rank three plays (O1, O2, O3). Suppose O1 is first with two critics and second with one; O2 and O3 share the remaining positions. The method assigns each play's positions across the three critics to a target rank that minimises the total cost, and places O1 first.
The festival management notes one point here: if the gap between O2 and O3 rests on only a single-position difference among the critics, several equal-cost assignments can arise between these two plays. In such a case, for the festival to draw a sharp line between second and third place is a claim of certainty the data itself does not support.
In the report: "In the three critics' ranking, O1 is placed first; the ranking between O2 and O3 rests on a small positional difference, and equal-cost alternative assignments should be checked."
3. Fire Service: Seven regional chiefs' equipment-supplier preference (a cycle example)
Seven regional chiefs of a fire service will choose among three equipment suppliers (İ1, İ2, İ3). Three chiefs prefer İ1 to İ2, and İ2 to İ3. Two chiefs prefer İ2 to İ3, and İ3 to İ1. Two chiefs prefer İ3 to İ1, and İ1 to İ2. This is the same-structured table that appears as a cycle in similar examples on the CONDORCET and COPELAND cards, yielding a "no winner" or "all three tied" result there.
COOK-SEIFORD looks at this table not through pairwise majority but directly through position numbers. İ1's positions across the seven chiefs come out closest overall to first place, İ2's to second, İ3's to third. The assignment minimising total cost places İ1 first, İ2 second, İ3 third, and this assignment is unique; no other equal-cost assignment exists.
| Supplier | Assigned rank |
|---|---|
| İ1 | 1 |
| İ2 | 2 |
| İ3 | 3 |
This result coincides with the rank KEMENY-YOUNG finds on the same table, but COOK-SEIFORD reaches it by an entirely different route; pairwise majority is never looked at, only the position numbers are reconciled. The chiefs notice something here: CONDORCET says there is a cycle in this table, COPELAND says all three suppliers hold an equal net score. Yet the position-based view (COOK-SEIFORD) and the total-disagreement-based view (KEMENY-YOUNG) arrive at the same complete rank. This shows that different methods, using different logics, can reach a similar result; but this coincidence is not guaranteed for every data set.
In the report: "Once the positions given by the seven regional chiefs are reconciled, İ1 is placed first, İ2 second, İ3 third; this assignment is unique and has no equal-cost alternative."
Source: this case was constructed to demonstrate, with a seven-source example, how Cook and Seiford's (1978) distance-based consensus idea behaves in the face of a Condorcet cycle; the figures were calculated for this card.
4. What Not to Do
Presenting the first case's assignment ("C first, A second") as though it were the single correct result is wrong; the textbook itself states that several equal-cost assignments exist for this problem. A second error is presenting a COOK-SEIFORD result as though it were a majority winner; the method carries out no pairwise comparison, it only reconciles position numbers. A third error is reading the total cost as though it were a success percentage; this figure is only the total absolute position difference, and it being low does not mean "good" nor high "bad" — it shows only how tight the agreement among the sources is.
Sources
For the formulas behind each step, the intermediate tables and citation formats, see the DecisionMind method page: decisionmind.app/library/cook-seiford
Cook, W. D., & Seiford, L. M. (1978). Priority ranking and consensus formation. Management Science, 24(16), 1721-1732. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.24.16.1721
Armstrong, R. D., Cook, W. D., & Seiford, L. M. (1982). Priority ranking and consensus formation: The case of ties. Management Science, 28(6), 638-645. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.28.6.638
Orakçı, E. (2024). Çok Kriterli Karar Verme Problemleri için Toplulaştırma Teknikleri. Özgür Yayınları, §1.8.7. DOI: 10.58830/ozgur.pub623