Methods · Aggregation and voting
COPELAND (Net Wins Method)
COPELAND compares every alternative against all its rivals in pairs and builds a complete rank from the net score obtained by subtracting the number of losses from the number of wins.
Base method's data type: Classical
What Is the Method?
COPELAND is an aggregation method that reduces several ranking sources ("the prioritisation of three experts," "the ranking given by five criteria") to a single rank. Its input is a table in which every source ranks the alternatives; its output is a net score for each alternative, found by subtracting its number of losses from its number of wins, and a complete rank based on that score. Unlike CONDORCET's stance of "say nothing if there is no winner," COPELAND always produces a rank, even where a cycle exists. Arthur Copeland proposed it in a 1951 seminar note, and it is known in social choice theory as the simplest method extending the Condorcet idea into a complete ranking.
The Philosophy Behind It
COPELAND's idea resembles a league table: every team plays every rival once, wins are added up, losses subtracted, and the ranking follows the remaining net score. Like CONDORCET, COPELAND looks only at pairwise comparisons; it rests on who wins a majority against whom. But where CONDORCET answers only the question "is there someone who beats every rival," COPELAND gives every alternative a number, and this number is enough to build a rank even where a cycle exists.
This simplicity carries a cost. COPELAND uses only the information of "who beat whom," not by how many votes. In a cycle-free comparison among three alternatives, the net scores always come out in the pattern plus two, zero, minus two; which alternative gets which score varies, but the pattern itself does not change. This shows the method is insensitive to margin, sensitive only to direction.
How It Works
The method proceeds through four steps.
First, gathering the ranks. Every source ranks the alternatives; these ranks are combined into one table.
Second, counting pairwise majorities. For every pair of alternatives, how many sources place which one ahead is counted.
Third, calculating the net score. For every alternative, the number of rivals it loses to by majority is subtracted from the number of rivals it beats by majority. If there is a tie with a rival, that pairwise contribution counts as zero.
Fourth, ranking. Alternatives are arranged by net score from highest to lowest. The highest net score marks first place.
The formulas behind each step and the intermediate tables are given on the DecisionMind method page; this card carries no formulas.
How to Read the Output
The net score is the difference between how many rivals an alternative beats and how many it loses to; it says nothing more. Scoring plus two does not mean "perfect," it means "beat both rivals"; scoring minus two means "lost to both rivals." Scoring zero can mean "beat one rival, lost to one rival," or "tied with every rival"; both situations appear as the same number.
The size of the score does not show by how many votes the win was secured. Whether an alternative beats a rival by nine votes to one, or by six votes to five, its contribution is the same, plus one, either way. If a cycle exists, COPELAND still gives a rank, but the ties within that rank (several alternatives receiving the same net score) must be resolved by an external preference; the method itself does not do this.
For that reason, instead of writing:
"According to COPELAND, this alternative is best because it has the highest net score"
it is correct to write:
"This alternative wins a majority in most of the pairwise comparisons; the size of the win is not reflected in this score, and an additional criterion is needed among alternatives with equal scores"
Data Type and Inputs
COPELAND works with crisp data: each source's rank information is a whole number. DecisionMind has no fuzzy, grey or similar data-type extension of this method; it works only with crisp rank data.
You need the following: a table in which every source ranks all the alternatives completely. A minimum of two alternatives and two ranking sources is required; three to twelve alternatives work comfortably. COPELAND neither asks for nor produces weights; every source's vote is counted equally.
When to Use It, When Not To
COPELAND is suitable if you have several ranking sources and want a complete rank no matter what, even where a cycle turns up. Its typical territory includes vote aggregation, sports-league-style rankings, and combining the ranks produced by several criteria.
The case where it should not be used is one where the size of the win also matters. COPELAND looks only at direction; whether an alternative beats a rival by an overwhelming majority or by a very narrow margin is not reflected in the score. If cycles are frequent and ties leave the decision unclear, a method that also accounts for margin is needed instead.
A simple, universally understood net score is enough → COPELAND
Winning margin also matters, I want the least disagreement → KEMENY-YOUNG
I want to find a winner with the least change, even under a cycle → DODGSON
I want to see clearly when there is no winner, a complete rank is not essential → CONDORCET
Strengths
COPELAND's greatest strength is its simplicity and the fact that it always produces a rank. Its calculation can be followed by hand, it reads like a league table, and it never leaves the decision-maker empty-handed even where a cycle turns up. The method does not depend on any choice of weighting or normalisation; it rests only on pairwise majority. This makes it a natural choice for combining sources of different scales and units, because it asks for nothing beyond rank information.
Weaknesses
COPELAND's fundamental limitation is its insensitivity to margin; it looks only at who beat whom, not by how many votes (Saari and Merlin, 1996). Second, in the case of a cycle, several alternatives can receive the same net score, and the method cannot resolve this tie on its own; an external preference is required. Third, in a cycle-free comparison among three alternatives, the net scores always come out in the same pattern (plus two, zero, minus two); this limits how discriminating the score itself remains as the number of alternatives grows.
Common Mistakes
The most common mistake is reading the net score as though it were a percentage or a vote share; the score is only the difference between the number of pairwise contests won and lost. A second mistake is favouring one of two alternatives with equal net scores without justification; if a tie exists, how it was resolved must be stated clearly in the report. A third is using COPELAND in a decision where winning margin matters and presenting the result as "decisive superiority"; the method never sees margin at all. A fourth is allowing some sources to rank the alternatives incompletely; every source must rank all the alternatives.
The governing principle is this:
The COPELAND net score is only a count of who beat whom; the size of the win, or how ties were resolved, must be explained separately in the report.
Cases
Each case opens with a table of several ranking sources, describes in words what the method does to it, and shows how to read the result. The first case is taken from the method's founding source. The third case shows concretely, with real numbers, how COPELAND behaves in the face of a cycle.
1. Courier: Three logistics specialists' supplier ranking (Copeland, 1951)
At a courier company, three logistics specialists (U1, U2, U3) will rank three suppliers (A1, A2, A3); the majority threshold is two of the three specialists.
| Supplier | U1 | U2 | U3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| A2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| A3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
The method compares every pair. A1 versus A2: U1 and U3 place A1 ahead, U2 places A2 ahead; A1 wins 2-1. A1 versus A3: all three specialists place A1 ahead, A1 wins 3-0. A2 versus A3: U1 and U2 place A2 ahead, U3 places A3 ahead; A2 wins 2-1.
| Supplier | Net score | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| A1 | 2 | 1 |
| A2 | 0 | 2 |
| A3 | -2 | 3 |
A1 beats both rivals, scoring plus two. A2 beats one rival and loses to one, scoring zero. A3 loses to both rivals, scoring minus two.
The specialists hesitate here: A1's superiority over A3 is unanimous, but A1's superiority over A2 rests on a single vote. Had U2 changed their view, the gap between A1 and A2 would close; the three-way rank would stay the same, because A3 would still finish last, but the margin for first place would narrow further.
In the report: "In the three specialists' ranking, A1 comes first with a net score of two, having beaten both rivals; the gap between A1 and A2 rests on a single specialist's view."
Source: Copeland (1951), an unpublished seminar note. This example is DecisionMind's validation example for the COPELAND engine; it was constructed for illustrative purposes.
2. Waste Management: Three municipal specialists' crane-supplier preference
In a municipality's waste management unit, three specialists (E1, E2, E3) will rank three suppliers (V1, V2, V3) for a refuse-collection vehicle. E1 and E3 place V1 first, while E2 sees V2 ahead. The method counts the pairwise comparisons and finds that V1 beats both V2 and V3, and V2 beats V3; the net scores come out as plus two, zero, minus two respectively.
The specialists notice here that this pattern (plus two, zero, minus two) is unavoidable in every cycle-free comparison among three alternatives; the real information is which supplier gets which score, not the scores themselves. V1's superiority over V2 is secured by two votes, and V2's superiority over V3 also by two votes; both carry the same margin, but COPELAND does not show this equality in the net score.
In the report: "In the three specialists' ranking, V1 comes first, having beaten both rivals; the gaps between V1 and V2, and between V2 and V3, are of the same size, but the net score does not distinguish this."
3. Public Transport: Seven district representatives' route preference (a cycle example)
Seven district representatives of a metropolitan public transport unit will choose among three new route plans (G1, G2, G3). Three representatives prefer G1 to G2, and G2 to G3. Two representatives prefer G2 to G3, and G3 to G1. Two representatives prefer G3 to G1, and G1 to G2.
G1 beats G2 5-2. G2 beats G3 5-2. G3 beats G1 4-3. Every route beats one rival and loses to one; all three net scores are zero. COPELAND must give a rank here, yet all three routes carry an equal net score; the method cannot make a choice on its own.
This is the situation in which COPELAND's insensitivity to margin appears most starkly: G1's superiority over G2 comes by a wide margin, five to two, while G3's superiority over G1 comes by a narrow margin, four to three, yet both count with the same weight in the net score. DecisionMind's other aggregation cards (KEMENY-YOUNG, DODGSON, COOK-SEIFORD) take up this same seven-representative table; because those methods also account for margin, they reach a result favouring G1, whereas COPELAND shows all three as equal.
In the report: "In the seven district representatives' preferences, all three routes have a net score of zero; COPELAND cannot give a priority order on its own, and an additional criterion or a margin-sensitive method is needed."
Source: this case was constructed to demonstrate, with a seven-source example, how Copeland's (1951) net-score method behaves in the face of a cycle; the figures were calculated for this card.
4. What Not to Do
Presenting A1's net score of plus two from the first case as "won against a hundred per cent of the alternatives" is wrong; the score shows only that two pairwise contests were won. A second error is overlooking the three equal net scores in the third case and declaring G1 "best according to COPELAND"; all three are equal, and the method does not discriminate among them on its own. A third error is presenting the superiority A1 secures over A2 by a single vote with the same certainty as the unanimous superiority it secures over A3; the net score does not show this difference, and the report must state it separately.
Sources
For the formulas behind each step, the intermediate tables and citation formats, see the DecisionMind method page: decisionmind.app/library/copeland
Copeland, A. H. (1951). A "reasonable" social welfare function. Mimeograph, University of Michigan Seminar on Applications of Mathematics to Social Sciences. (no DOI)
Saari, D. G., & Merlin, V. R. (1996). The Copeland method I.: Relationships and the dictionary. Economic Theory, 8(1), 51-76. DOI: 10.1007/s001990050077