AggregationOperator
Schulze Method: Beat-path Condorcet-consistent rank aggregation
Schulze, M. · 2011
Overview
Rank aggregation (beat-path, polynomial time, Condorcet-consistent). Output typically rank_position (lower value = preferred).
Strengths
- •Method-specific: Rank aggregation (beat-path, polynomial time, Condorcet-consistent)
- •Native group-decision support (multi-DM aggregation built into the pipeline)
Limitations
- •Assumes: Input is a rank matrix (1=best, m=worst per voter)
- •Assumes: Each voter ranks all alternatives
Method assistant
Grounded explanations: it explains the method, it does not compute.
Assumptions to verify
- •Input is a rank matrix (1=best, m=worst per voter)
- •Each voter ranks all alternatives
When not to use
- •Cardinal preferences important → use a MAUT method
Edge cases
- •See F.steps and D.parameters for SCHULZE-specific edge handling. recommendation_metadata.assumptions_to_verify also lists boundary conditions.
Common pitfalls
- •Hatalı: 'SCHULZE bu varsayımı kontrol etmeden uygulamak'. Doğrusu: Input is a rank matrix (1=best, m=worst per voter)
- •Hatalı: 'SCHULZE bu varsayımı kontrol etmeden uygulamak'. Doğrusu: Each voter ranks all alternatives
- •Hatalı: SCHULZE'yi 'Cardinal preferences important → use a MAUT method' durumunda kullanmak: recommendation_metadata.not_recommended_when alternatif öneriyor.
Worked example
- 1.Adım 1 (F1): Step 1: Collect K expert rankings R_k. Formül: \mathcal{R} = \{R_{1}, \ldots, R_{K}\} Anchor: Schulze 2011, p.273 Sec.2
- 2.Adım 2 (F2): Step 2: Pairwise preference matrix d[a,b] = #{k: a ≻_k b}. Formül: d[a,b] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mathbb{1}[a \succ_{k} b] Anchor: Schulze 2011, p.273 Eq.(1)
- 3.Adım 3 (F3): Step 3: Strongest path p[a,b] via widest-path Floyd-Warshall. Formül: p[a,b] = \max_{\text{paths}\ a\to b} \min_{(u,v)\in\text{path}} d[u,v] Anchor: Schulze 2011, p.274 Eq.(2)
- 4.Adım 4 (F4): Step 4: Schulze winner: a beats b iff p[a,b] > p[b,a]; derive ranking. Formül: a \succ_{S} b \iff p[a,b] > p[b,a] Anchor: Schulze 2011, p.275 Theorem 1
How to cite
Schulze, M. (2011). A new monotone and clone-independent single-winner election method. Voting Matters. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4