Methods · Aggregation and voting
SCHULZE (Schulze Method)
The Schulze method compares alternatives pairwise and finds the strongest indirect path of superiority between every pair, producing a single order that is consistent with those pairwise comparisons.
Base method's data type: Classical
What Is the Method?
The Schulze method takes several rankings at once, whether produced by several experts, several voters or several methods, and turns them into a single common ranking. Its distinguishing feature is that it does not do this by simply summing scores; it first compares every pair of alternatives separately, starting from the answer to "in how many sources did A finish ahead of B." These pairwise superiorities are then treated as a network of paths, and the strongest indirect path is found for every pair. Its output is a score for every alternative and the ranking that score produces. The method was proposed by Markus Schulze in 2011 and has been favoured by some open-source software communities and internet-based voting systems for its strong mathematical properties, such as clone independence, meaning that adding or removing candidates very similar to one another does not disturb the result.
The Philosophy Behind It
The idea comes from taking the majority principle seriously at the pairwise level: if one alternative is preferred to another in more sources when compared directly, that counts as a "win." Yet real data sets can contain cycles, A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A, in which case a simple ranking is not possible. Schulze resolves such cycles as follows: even where there is no direct superiority between two alternatives, if an indirect "chain of superiority" runs between them, the strength of that chain's weakest link is what counts, and the strongest of all possible chains between two alternatives is taken as decisive.
This carries a philosophical consequence: Schulze is a consistency method, not a compensatory or conciliatory one. The method seeks an answer to "who beats whom, directly or indirectly"; a high average score does not save an alternative, what matters is genuine superiority in the pairwise comparisons. This is what sets Schulze apart from position-summing methods such as Borda.
How It Works
The method proceeds through four steps.
First, gathering the source rankings. Every ranking produced for the same set of alternatives, whether by experts, votes or methods, is brought together.
Second, counting pairwise superiority. For every pair of alternatives, it is counted in how many sources one alternative finished ahead of the other. This gives, for each pair, a one-directional count of "how many sources preferred A to B."
Third, finding the strongest indirect path. Whether or not a direct superiority exists between two alternatives, every possible chain running through intermediate alternatives is scanned. The strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link, that is, its lowest pairwise superiority count. The strongest of all chains between two alternatives is recorded as the "strongest path" for that pair. This is repeated for every pair.
Fourth, determining the winner. If the strongest path from A to B is stronger than the strongest path from B to A, A beats B. This pairwise beats-relation is derived for every pair, and an overall ranking is obtained from it.
The formulas behind each step and the intermediate tables are given on the DecisionMind method page; this card carries no formulas.
How to Read the Output
The score Schulze gives summarises an alternative's net pairwise superiority over the others; it is derived from the difference between how many alternatives it beats and how many it is beaten by. This score is not a percentage, and it does not show "how good" the alternative is, only its net position in the pairwise comparisons. A positive score shows that the alternative beats more than it is beaten by; a negative score shows the reverse.
Schulze's strongest feature is that, if the data set contains an alternative that wins every pairwise comparison (a Condorcet winner), it will always find it. But where a genuine cycle exists (three alternatives beating one another in turn), the strongest path between two alternatives can come out equal; this is a genuine tie, not a computational error, and the report must state this clearly.
Thus instead of writing:
"The Schulze method found the best alternative"
the report should read:
"Based on the pairwise comparisons within this set of sources, this is the alternative with the strongest indirect superiority; this result prioritises pairwise consistency, a different logic from methods that prioritise average score"
Data Type and Inputs
Schulze works with a crisp ranking matrix: alternatives in rows, different ranking sources (experts, votes or the output of other methods) in columns, and in every cell an integer rank position from 1 to m, where 1 denotes the best position. Every source must have ranked all the alternatives. The method does not produce weights; every source is given equal weight by default, though DecisionMind also allows different weights to be assigned to sources. There is currently no additional member alongside this base method; a minimum of two alternatives and two separate ranking sources is required.
When to Use It, When Not To
Schulze is suitable if you have several rankings and want, when combining them, a ranking that is consistent in pairwise comparisons and resistant to cycles, and if you also care that adding or removing an alternative afterwards (adding a clone) does not disturb the result. If the number of sources is very small, such as only two, the strength of the pairwise comparisons is reduced and the result readily falls into ties. If there is no pairwise disagreement at all among the sources, that is, everyone gives the same ranking, Schulze's elaborate path-finding logic becomes an unnecessary burden and a simple aggregation suffices.
Combine several rankings, prioritise pairwise consistency and resistance to cycles → Schulze
A simple average score is sufficient → Borda / average ranking
Find the middling position most resistant to outlier views → median ranking
Keep Borda-style scoring but search for a Condorcet winner through elimination rounds → Nanson
Strengths
Schulze's core advantage is that, if a Condorcet winner exists, it will always find one, a property many simple aggregation methods cannot guarantee. It also carries clone independence, meaning that adding or removing two very similar alternatives at the same time does not disturb the ranking between the others. Its computation, finding the strongest indirect path, can be carried out in polynomial time with a classical graph algorithm (the widest-path problem, a variant of Floyd-Warshall); this is an advantage compared with the computational difficulty of some other pairwise comparison methods (Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick, 1989).
Weaknesses
Its limitations stem mainly from intelligibility. First, the concept of the strongest indirect path is not intuitive; the answer to a decision-maker's question of "why did this alternative win" cannot be conveyed as easily as a simple total such as a Borda score. Second, where a genuine cycle exists, the strongest path between two alternatives can come out equal, and in that case the method cannot make the distinction on its own. Third, different Condorcet methods (Schulze, ranked pairs, Kemeny-Young) can give different results in cyclic cases, and which is "most correct" remains debated, a debate that Schulze himself has continued (Schulze, 2024).
Common Mistakes
The most common mistake is confusing the pairwise superiority count with a shortcut such as "is A better on average," rather than "in how many sources was A preferred to B"; Schulze's strength comes precisely from this pairwise count, and this step cannot be skipped. A second mistake is limiting the strongest-path calculation to direct comparisons only, leaving indirect chains out of account; this reduces Schulze to a simple majority method. A third mistake is confusing a genuine tie, where a cycle leaves both directions equally strong, with a computational error. A fourth mistake is presenting Schulze's result as the single "correct" answer without stating in the report that another Condorcet method, such as ranked pairs, could give a different result.
The governing principle is this:
Schulze looks for the strongest indirect superiority in pairwise comparisons; if a Condorcet winner exists, it finds it, and where a cycle exists the result depends on path strength, a fact the report must show.
Cases
Each case opens with a decision table, describes in words what the method does to it, and shows how to read the result. The first case is the engine's own validation example; the remaining cases are illustrative constructions.
1. Public administration: Three infrastructure projects ranked by three expert boards
A municipal planning unit has sought the opinion of three separate expert boards to set priorities among three infrastructure projects (A1, A2, A3). Each board has ranked the three projects from 1 to 3, with 1 denoting the highest-priority project.
| Project | Board 1 | Board 2 | Board 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| A1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| A2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| A3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
The method first counts the pairwise superiority for every pair: A1 was found more of a priority than A2 by two boards (Board 1 and Board 3), while A2 was found more of a priority than A1 by only one board (Board 2); A1 outranked A3 in all three boards; A2 outranked A3 in two boards. From these pairwise counts, the strongest indirect paths are derived. In this example, because the direct superiorities are already consistent (there is no cycle), the strongest paths are the same as the direct superiorities.
| Project | Score | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| A1 | 1.0 | 1 |
| A2 | 0.0 | 2 |
| A3 | -1.0 | 3 |
The result reads as follows. A1 is first because it beats both A2 and A3 in pairwise comparison. A2 is left in the middle because it lost to A1 but beat A3. A3 is last because it lost to both other projects. Since there is no cycle in this example, the order Schulze gives is one that could also be found by a simple majority count; Schulze's real strength emerges in cyclic cases.
The planning unit hesitates here: the gap between A1 and A2 comes solely from Board 2's differing opinion, since the other two boards voted the same way. This one board's different prioritisation criterion, perhaps weighted towards social impact rather than budget, should be examined separately; Schulze does not explain the reason for this difference, it only computes the pairwise outcome.
In the report: "When the three expert boards' rankings are combined with the Schulze method, the project in the strongest pairwise position is A1; the difference between A1 and A2 stems from a single board's differing opinion."
Source: This example was prepared to validate DecisionMind's Schulze engine and checked for consistency with the formulas; it is not a table taken verbatim from the founding paper (Schulze, 2011). The DecisionMind team is considering adding the founding paper's own numerical example to the card in future.
2. Publishing: Four books ranked for an award by three editorial boards
A publishing house has formed a three-member jury to choose among four books for its annual literary award; each jury member has independently ranked the four books.
The method first compares every pair of books, then finds the strongest indirect superiority paths. Suppose two of the three jury members place one book first, while the third member places the same book last; that book can still finish first, winning the pairwise comparisons on the strength of the other two members' support.
The publishing house hesitates here: why the third jury member gave this book such a low score should be asked separately, because although Schulze's pairwise calculation reflects this outlying view in the result, it does not explain the reason for it. Whether a cycle has formed among the four books, for instance between the books in second and third place, should also be checked.
In the report: "When the three jury members' rankings are combined with the Schulze method, the strongest book in pairwise comparison is this one; one jury member's outlying assessment should be reviewed separately."
3. Telecommunications: Three infrastructure suppliers ranked by technical teams
A telecom operator is choosing among three suppliers for a network renewal project and has sought the opinion of three separate technical teams: network engineering, security and field operations.
The method combines the three teams' rankings by pairwise comparison. Suppose the network engineering team places supplier B first, the security team places supplier C first, and the field operations team places supplier A first, and these three opinions beat one another in turn: B beats A, A beats C, and C beats B. This is a complete cycle.
The operator hesitates here: in such a cycle, Schulze looks at the strength of the strongest indirect paths, and where the pairwise superiority counts are not equal, for instance if the count by which B beats A differs from the count by which C beats B, a ranking emerges; but if the counts are also equal, a genuine tie results and an additional decision rule, such as a fourth team's opinion, is required.
In the report: "A cyclical contradiction was found among the three technical teams' rankings; the Schulze method places this supplier ahead based on the strongest indirect superiority, but because of the cycle, the result should be supported by an additional team's opinion."
4. What Not to Do
Had the pairwise superiority count in the first case's table been skipped in favour of direct Borda scoring, the result would not have been Schulze but a different method (Borda or Nanson); Schulze's distinguishing step is pairwise comparison and the strongest-path calculation, and this step cannot be omitted. A second error is looking only at direct comparisons in the strongest-path calculation and leaving indirect chains, for instance a path from A to C running through B, out of account; this can produce the wrong result. A third error is mistaking a genuine tie arising from a cycle for a "computational error" and forcing out a ranking regardless; a tie must be shown in the report as a tie.
Sources
For the formulas behind each step, the intermediate tables and citation formats (BibTeX, RIS, APA), see the DecisionMind method page: decisionmind.app/library/schulze
Schulze, M. (2011). A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent single-winner election method. Social Choice and Welfare, 36(2), 267–303. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4
Schulze, M. (2024). Comment on "The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs". Constitutional Political Economy, 35(3), 439–442. DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09415-y
Young, H. P. (1988). Condorcet's theory of voting. American Political Science Review, 82(4), 1231–1244. DOI: 10.2307/1961757
Bartholdi, J., Tovey, C. A., & Trick, M. A. (1989). Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(2), 157–165. DOI: 10.1007/BF00303169